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Case Notes
Armed Services-Constitutional Law-Courts-Injunction-Peter-
sen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
Petersen filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California to enjoin his induction into the armed forces. 1 The complaint alleged
numerous procedural errors2 committed by the Selective Service board in the classi-
fication process. 3 Plaintiff contended that these errors denied him due process of law,
thus rendering illegal the induction order.
In a pre-trial order, the district court held that Section 460(b) (3) of the Military
Service Selective Act of 1967, 4 properly construed, barred pre-induction civil judicial
review of Selective Service orders. 5 The court granted Petersen leave to amend his
complaint to attack the constitutionality of the statute thus construed 6 and then issued
an order convening a three judge "constitutional court ' 7 on the ground that the
amended complaint raised a substantial federal question, i.e., the constitutionality of
Section 460(b) (3).8 The three judge court held that the action, insofar as it attacked
the constitutionality of the statute, did not necessitate a three judge court, and re-
manded the case to the district court for further consideration. 9 During this time,
Petersen was indicted for wilful failure to report for induction. 10
On remand, the government moved to dismiss Petersen's complaint on the ground
that Section 460(b) (3) deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction to review
Selective Service classification or processing procedures other than as a defense to a
prosecution under Section 460. Petersen opposed the motion by renewing his claim
1. Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
2. Petersen claimed that notifications were not sent as required and that the board
improperly refused to classify him as a conscientious objector according to the cri-
teria of United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
3. 81 Stat. 100, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 451-71 (Supp. 1967), amending 50 U.S.C. App.
§§451-71 (1964).
4. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. 1967):
No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any
registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense
to a criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title . . . after the
registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report
for induction, or for civilian work in the case of a registrant determined to be
opposed to participation in war in any form ...
5. Petersen v. Clark, supra note 1.
6. The suggestion that such an attack was possible apparently came from the court.
Petersen v. Clark, supra note 1, at 694.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1964).
8. Petersen v. Clark, supra note 1, at 697.
9. Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (per curiam).
10. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964). Petersen actually did report for in-
duction, but refused to take the symbolic step forward.
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that although article III of the Constitution grants to Congress the power to regulate
original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, this power is limited by the fifth
amendment's due process clause, which requires Congress to provide for constitu-
tional review in some court so that his right may be enforced prior to prosecution. 11
In denying the government's motion to dismiss 1 2 the district court held Section
460(b) (3) unconstitutional on its face and a denial of due process insofar as it places
an individual in the position of having either to:
(1) comply with an allegedly invalid order when compliance may subject him
to such restraint of liberty as military service entails, or (2) risk criminal
prosecution to judicially test the order's validity.13
I. Prior Law
This is the first case to meet directly the question of the constitutionality of Section
460(b) (3). The statute and its antecedents 14 have consistently been interpreted as a
bar to all pre-induction review15 except in limited instances.1 6 Moreover, the con-
tinuing validity of these exceptions appears doubtful when the congressional re-
enactment of the statute is read together with its pertinent legislative history.' 7 This
note will explore prior law to determine problems of review arising under the statute
and judicial attempts to resolve conflicts between congressional intent and due pro-
cess requirements for a fair hearing. These cases fall into three categories which often
overlap: (1) cases involving local board orders issued in excess of jurisdiction; (2)
cases involving local board action infringing on constitutional rights; and (3) cases
involving violation of procedural guarantees normally afforded an individual in a
judicial proceeding. Only the first two categories will be discussed.
A. Local Board Orders in Excess of Jurisdiction. In Estep v. United States,18 the
Supreme Court construed the statute antecedent to Section 460(b) (3)19 as allowing,
11. Plaintiff, apparently renewing a claim that had already been denied, seems not
to have understood his position. The court in its opinion draws attention to his confu-
sion. Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700, 701-2 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
12. The court did not enjoin induction; however, the denial of the motion to dismiss
has the same effect, since the civil action must be disposed of before Petersen is prose-
cuted for failure to report. Ultimately Petersen prevailed in his civil suit. Petersen v.
Clark, Civ. No. 47888 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1968).
13. Petersen v. Clark, supra note 11, at 703. The court adopts the proposition that
military service entails restraint of liberty without discussion. All four Petersen opin-
ions were written by the same judge.
14. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 10(a) (2), (b) (3), 62 Stat. 604; Selec-
tive Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 10(a) (2), 54 Stat. 885.
15. Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 11, 390 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1968),
cert. granted, 88 S.Ct. 1804 (1968) (No. 1246, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 46, 1968
Term); Breen v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 284 F. Supp, 749 (D.C. Conn.
1968) ; Carpenter v. Hendrix, 277 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Moskowitz v. Kindt,
273 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
16. Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967);
Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956).
17. 81 Stat. 100; 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 451-71 (Supp. 1967), H.R. Rep. No. 267, S.
Rep. No. 209, Conf. Rep. No. 346, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967).
18. 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
19. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 10(a) (2), 54 Stat. 885.
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in a prosecution for wilful failure to report, the defense that the board's classification
had no basis in fact. 20 Estep had been denied an exemption as a "duly ordained
minister;" the district court limited the issue to whether he had reported for induction
and excluded evidence that he had been improperly classified. The statute was silent
on the question of judicial review of local board action, and the act specifically in-
volved the federal courts only for purposes of enforcement. The Court rejected the
government's contention that the statute barred all review. Noting that a question of
individual liberty was involved, the Court refused to accept a construction of con-
gressional intent which would impose criminal sanctions for non-compliance with ad-
ministrative orders issued beyond the board's jurisdiction.
21
The significance of Estep lies in the reasoning the Court employed rather than in its
direct holding. Two years earlier, in Falbo v. United States,22 the Court held on virtu-
ally indistinguishable facts that the same statute barred a defense in a criminal prosecu-
tion for wilful failure to report. In Estep, Justice Douglas, who had concurred in Falbo,
sought to distinguish the two cases on the basis that Falbo had not exhausted his ad-
ministrative remedies; 23 however, Falbo had taken all steps, except that he had
failed to undergo a physical examination at the induction camp.
24
The reasoning of Estep is a repudiation of Falbo. In the latter case, the Court was
concerned with the efficient procurement of manpower for war; in the former, the
Court focused on the safeguards normally afforded a defendant in a criminal prosecu-
tion.25 The Court observed: "We are loath to believe that Congress reduced criminal
trials under the Act to proceedings so barren of the customary safeguards which the
law has designed for the protection of the accused." 26 The Court was able to avoid a
direct repudiation of Falbo by requiring review at least where the board had acted
in excess of its jurisdiction or the classification had "no basis in fact," 27 provided the
registrant had exhausted his administrative remedies. The strong implication of Falbo
was that no review could be had; the holding in Estep granted post-induction review
at least where Congress had not expressed a contrary intent.
28
Witmer v. United States,29 is the first case in which the Court dealt with pre-
induction review. Witmer had been convicted for wilful failure to report. His defense
was that he had been illegally classified. The Court held that on the record it could
not find that his classification had no "basis in fact." However, the Court also observed
in dictum:
20. Specifically excluded from this note is a discussion of the scope of review allow-
able under the act.
21. Estep v. United States, supra note 18, at 121-22.
22. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
23. Estep v. United States, supra note 18, at 123.
24. Falbo v. United States, supra note 22, at 550.
25. Falbo was decided in the midst of World War II; whereas Estep was decided
after the end of the war.
26. Estep v. United States, supra note 18, at 122.
27. Ibid.
28. Mr. Justice Murphy, concurring in Estep on constitutional grounds, viewed the
construction in Falbo as an unconstitutional denial of due process. Estep v. United
States, supra note 18, at 126.
29. 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
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There is no direct judicial review of the actions of the Appeal Boards.
Questions concerning the classification of the registrant may be raised either in
a petition for habeas corpus or as a defense to prosecution for failure to
submit to induction into the armed forces.
30
No other mode of review was in issue since Witmer was appealing from a convic-
tion for failure to report.31 The Court cited no authority for the statement and it is
not even supported by argument. The portion quoted above is the only language to
this effect in the entire opinion, and lies between two unrelated paragraphs. Therefore,
the dictum can hardly be regarded as dispositive. The better view is that this state-
ment is no more than a description of procedural fact-that is, the Court only stated
what was then occurring in the courts, and not what might occur in the future or what
the Court might have done had the point been argued. This view has been adopted by
at least one circuit court of appeals. 32 Although the case is not direct authority either
on federal court subject matter jurisdiction or pre-induction review, the dictum has
convinced most courts that they do not have jurisdiction to entertain suits for pre-
induction review.
There is, however, at least one notable exception 33 to the Witmer line of cases. In
Townsend v. Zimmerman,34 Justice Stewart, then a circuit court judge, speaking for
a unanimous court, granted a preliminary injunction to enjoin plaintiff's scheduled
induction. Plaintiff had been classified 1-A upon separation from his wife. Later, when
they were reunited, he orally informed the draft board and asked that his 3-A defer-
ment be reinstated. The board held a hearing at which this request was denied. He
was subsequently order to report for induction, and filed suit for enjoinment.
The court held that where the board had acted beyond its jurisdiction in failing to
recognize the plaintiff's notice of internal Selective Service appeal, the court would
enjoin induction pending disposition. Significantly, in reversing the district court's
dismissal, the court makes no mention of Section 460(b) (3) as a bar to jurisdiction.
Instead, Judge Stewart applied to the local board the due process requirements of
a fair hearing traditionally required of an administrative agency. 35 He characterized
the action of the local board as "arbitrary" and "an abuse of discretion," 36 and re-
manded the case to the Selective Service System for further disposition conforming
with the regulations which the board had ignored. The case is directly analogous to
Petersen: in both the administrative agency exceeded its authority and ordered an
individual to obey an invalid order which restricted his liberty; each court intervened
30. Id. at 377.
31. Ibid.
32. Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, supra note 16, at 825-26.
33. See also Kimball v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 15, 283 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968).
34. Supra note 16.
35. See generally, 4 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 28 (1958).
36. Townsend v. Zimmerman, supra note 16, at 377. Some confusion may result from
the fact that Judge Stewart's characterization of the local board's action was phrased in
terms of a hypothetical. However, the issue was resolved in the affirmative since
the case was not remanded to the district court for determination; rather, the local
board was ordered to allow plaintiff's internal Selective Service appeal.
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prior to the citizen's risking a substantial penalty.3 7 The difference between the two
is that Judge Stewart did not consider Section 460(b) (3) as a bar to federal court
jurisdiction to review an induction order, whereas, to guarantee the registrant the
same safeguards, Judge Zirpoli in the instant case held it unconstitutional.
B. Local Board Action Infringing on Constitutional Rights. Under the government's
construction, Section 460(b)(3) bars pre-induction review even where a registrant's
constitutional rights are seriously impaired. One circuit court of appeals has felt that
such a result is inconsistent with the constitutional safeguards protecting first amend-
ment rights.
In Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16,38 Judge Medina, speaking for
a unanimous court, reversed a district court's refusal to preliminarily enjoin a plaintiff's
induction. Wolff had been reclassified 1-A after he had demonstrated against the
Vietnam war at a draft board. At the request of the Director of Selective Service for
New York City, he was deprived of his 2-S student deferment because of the demon-
stration. Wolff, alleging that his first amendment rights of free speech and assembly
had been violated, filed suit to enjoin his scheduled induction. The government suc-
cessfully urged Section 460(b) (3) as a bar to federal court pre-induction review of
Selective Service orders and the district court dismissed the action for want of juris-
diction. In reversing, Judge Medina emphasized that the board's conduct as alleged
was an unconstitutional sanction which would "cause immediate and irreparable in-
jury to the free exercise of rights as fragile and sensitive to suppression as the freedoms
of speech and assembly . . . ."39 The court disputed the government's construction of
Section 460(b) (3) as a bar to similar suits in all cases: "We are well aware that many
reported cases contain language, often by way of dictum as in Witmer . . . to the
general effect that the review . . . is possible only in criminal proceedings or on habeas
corpus petitions." 4 0 However, the court concluded that where the Selective Service
System inducts a person because he exercised his first amendment rights, the federal
courts may enjoin induction to protect against substantial impairment of these
rights.
4 1
The court recognized that, on its face and as interpreted, Section 460(b) (3) barred
the hearing it was granting. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that it could not ignore
its duty to protect Wolff's rights by enjoining the excessive zeal shown by the Selective
Service. Wolff is analagous to Petersen in two respects: both involved Selective Service
action allegedly in violation of a registrant's constitutional rights, and both courts
agreed that pre-induction review should be available where a local board acted in
excess of its jurisdiction.
37. Townsend v. Zimmerman, supra note 16, at 377; Petersen v. Clark, supra note 11,
at 702. The order was allegedly invalid in Petersen whereas it was held invalid in
Zimmerman.
38. Supra note 16.
39. Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, supra note 16, at 824.
40. Id. at 825-26.
41. Id. at 826.
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II. The Scope of the Problem in Petersen
The court in Petersen was faced with a more difficult problem than were the courts in
Zimmerman or Wolff. Two recent legal developments had left the court with the al-
ternative of denying jurisdiction or holding the statute unconstitutional. Several months
earlier, Congress had passed the Military Service Selective Act of 1967,42 making
important changes restricting the review available within the Selective Service Sys-
tem.43 Section 460(b) (3) was re-enacted substantially without change; it provides
judicial review only after an affirmative or negative response to an induction order,
and then only by way of defense in a criminal prosecution.44 Therefore, circum-
stances involving an infringement of constitutional rights (Wolff) or a local board's
exceeding its jurisdiction (Zimmerman) cannot, on the face of the Act, be reviewed
prior to induction. Congress resolved any doubt as to its intention; the House Armed
Services Committee Report 45 specifically mentions those cases which had allowed
pre-induction review, stating that henceforth such review is to be had only. after
induction. Hence, if pre-induction review was to be available at all in Petersen, it had
to be on constitutional rather than statutory grounds.
The second development involved the government's position in Oestereich v. Selec-
tive Service Local Board No. 11.46 Oestereich, a ministerial student, lost his exemp-
tion and was reclassified 1-A for his involvement in an anti-Vietnam war protest. In
his memorandum, the Solicitor General stated:
What Selective Service Board No. 11 has done is to terminate by administra-
tive action, the exemption which has been granted by the statute. If that ac-
tion was contrary to the express terms of the act of Congress granting the
exemption, this is obviously relevant in considering the application of the
procedural provision on which the government has relied in this case. [i.e.,
Section 460(b) (3).
Of course, the question of the board's power to disregard the statute could
be raised in defense to a criminal prosecution or in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing after induction. This, however, is a heavy burden to put on the citizen if
the board has in fact acted contrary to the terms of the statute .... 47 (Em-
phasis added.)
The Solicitor General then suggested that the judgment below be reversed and that,
if the requisite jurisdictional amount be found,48 a decree be entered in Oestereich's
favor enjoining the induction. He also proposed that pre-induction review be granted
only where the local board has denied an exemption granted by Congress and not in
42. 81 Stat. 100, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 451-71 (Supp. 1967), amending 50 U.S.C.
App. §§ 451-71 (1964).
43. For a good general discussion of the problems involved, see White, Processing
Conscientious Objector Claims: A Constitutional Inquiry, 56 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1967).
44. The statute also codifies Estep and Witmer but does not provide for review in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
45. H. R. Rep. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1967).
46. Supra note 15.
47. Memorandum for Respondents at 11, 13, Oestereich v. Selective Service Local
Bd. No. 11, supra note 15.
48. See Kimball v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 15, supra note 33, at 606-07.
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cases of deferments, undoubtedly to reduce litigation. The Solicitor General does not
make clear whether he would allow pre-induction review in cases where constitu-
tional rights are threatened as in Wolff. Under his reasoning, a married man with
dependent children and a wife who did not work would be forced to either risk
criminal prosecution or comply with an admittedly invalid order to test its validity,
scarcely a heavier burden on a citizen than that on a young single ministerial student
such as Oestereich.
Consequently, the court in Petersen was faced not only with a clear congressional
statement of intent that the statute should bar all pre-induction review, but also with
the government's admission that under certain circumstances where a "heavy burden"
was placed on the citizen, the court would allow review, a reason which the Supreme
Court found adequate to strike down a rate-making procedure in Ex parte Young 49
as violative of due process.
III. The Solution in Petersen
The Petersen court approached the problem first from the standpoint of congressional
power to eliminate all review of Selective Service orders. In interpreting article III's
grant to Congress of jurisdictional power over federal courts, 50 the court exhaustively
collected cases51 requiring judicial review of administrative orders at some point.
The argument is that while Congress may have power over the means of review,
52
due process requires, as an end, that there be an independent judicial proceeding to
insure a fair hearing and the protection of fundamental rights. In this connection, the
court adopted Mr. Justice Frankfurter's definition of due process:
[B]y "due process" is meant [a process] which, following the forms of law,
is appropriate to the case, and just to the parties to be affected. It must be
pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by the law; it must be adapted to
the end to be attained; and wherever it is necessary for the protection of the
parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice
of the judgment sought .... [W]hether acting through its judiciary or through
its legislature, a State may not deprive a person of all existing remedies for
the enforcement of a right, which the State has no power to destroy, unless
there is, or was, afforded to him some real opportunity to protect it.53
49. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
50. For a discussion of the problem on the basis of the separation of powers, see
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953).
51. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932);
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); American School of Magnetic Healing v. Mc-
Annulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902); Bustos-Ovalle v. Landon, 225 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1955);
Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
52. In Yakus v. United States, supra note 51, at 434-36, the Court indicated that re-
view could be severely limited so long as the basic right to review remained unim-
paired.
53. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, supra note 51, at 162 (concur-
ring opinion).
1968]
Catholic University Law Review
The court concluded that some review of an administrative action which operates in a
coercive way upon an individual is essential to due process. Though the standard may
be somewhat vague, the reason is that the requirements of due process have historically
been articulated on a case-by-case basis and are inherently incapable of finding ex-
pression in a hard and fast rule. 54 If it were otherwise, the effectiveness of this most
delicate of constitutional tools would be substantially impaired.
Noting that the act made provision for post-induction review, the court then ex-
amined the adequacy of the remedy. The court's characterization of the position in
which an individual was placed by virtue of an order to report for induction led it to
conclude that there was no substantial difference between Petersen and the line of
cases following Ex parte Young. 55 In Petersen, the court argued that an individual
either had to obey an allegedly invalid order or risk criminal prosecution to obtain
independent judicial review of the order's validity. In Ex parte Young, a state rate-
making procedure permitted the validity of state rate orders to be tested only in a
criminal prosecution for noncompliance. In that case, the Supreme Court held the
procedure to be inherently coercive and a denial of any hearing to the company.5 6
In Petersen, the court argued that the provision for review unfairly denied a registrant
an independent judicial hearing insofar as such a hearing could be had only at a sub-
stantial risk to personal liberty. Such a result, the court concluded, was a denial of
any meaningful hearing at all, insofar as many registrants would be dissuaded from
seeking to obtain the judicial review that due process requires. Thus, the court held
Section 460(b) (3) unconstitutional.
Were a state agency involved, no doubt the court would have had little difficulty
basing its action on the incorporation doctrine of the fourteenth amendment. How-
ever, there is precedent for using the due process clause of the fifth amendment to
achieve a similar standard for federal action. In Boiling v. Sharpe,57 the Court was
faced with the difficulty of applying the doctrine of Brown v. Board of Education
58
to the then-segregated schools of the District of Columbia. The Court held that the
due process clause of the fifth amendment required the same standard as the four-
teenth amendment required of the states.
IV. Conclusion
The result reached in Petersen brings the Selective Service System within the same
standard of review now required of other administrative agencies. The result is equit-
able since, before Petersen, a registrant generally sought review only when he was
willing to ignore the stigma and burden of a criminal prosecution or to risk the ire of
54. White, supra note 43.
55. Supra note 49; see also Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964); St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. United States, supra note 51; Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286
U.S. 461 (1932); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196 (1924); St.
Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919); Wadley
Southern Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651 (1915) ; Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Tucker, 230
U.S. 340 (1913) ; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
56. Ex parte Young, supra note 49, at 148.
57. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Army officials by bringing expensive habeas corpus proceedings even in cases where
Selective Service action either impaired constitutional rights or clearly violated applic-
able statutes or regulations.
The due process clause is the appropriate vehicle for bringing the Selective Service
System within the ambit of normal procedural guarantees since it permits a court to
balance the constitutional interest in providing a fair hearing for registrants against the
need for an efficient conscription mechanism. The great utility of this clause is that it
enables courts to set a minimum standard-in this case by requiring a fair and inde-
pendent judicial hearing-while leaving to the legislative branch alternative means to
more rigidly define a standard of review that would both insure a registrant a fair
hearing and provide as well for an orderly draft procedure. The Congress is un-
doubtedly in a better position to decide what class of registrants should be entitled to
pre-induction review and what form the review should take. However, by using the
due process tool a court is able, where Congress fails to act, to draw the line beyond
which the state may not encroach on individual liberty.
One judge has already been persuaded by the reasoning of Petersen. In Gabriel v.
Clark,5 9 another court of the same district enjoined plaintiff's induction pending pre-
induction review and specifically adopted Petersen as the basis for its decision. 60 Al-
though the government failed to appeal in Petersen, it intends to seek direct appeal
61 to
the Supreme Court in Gabriel.
62
59. Gabriel v. Clark, Civ. No. 49419 (N.D. Cal., June 23, 1968).
60. Id. at 2.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1964).
62. See Brief for Respondents at 22, Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 11,
supra note 15: "The government intends to take a direct appeal to the Court in the
Gabriel case."
Criminal Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Juveniles-
Waiver-Sentencing-Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W. 2d
374 (Ky. 1968).
Two fourteen-year-old boys broke into the home of a seventy-one-year-old woman,
raped her several times, and stole five dollars. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction
to the grand jury,1 which indicted defendants for rape. They were then tried, con-
victed, and sentenced as adults, punishment being fixed at life imprisonment with-
out benefit of parole.2 On their motion to vacate sentence, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky held that a sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, as ap-
1. Pursuant to Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.170 (1963).
2. Pursuant to Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 435.090 (1963):
Any person who unlawfully carnally knows a female of and above twelve years of
age against her will . . . shall be punished . . . by confinement in the penitentiary
for life without privilege of parole . ...
1968)
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plied to fourteen-year-old rapists, violated the eighth amendment of the United States
Constitution and section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution, each forbidding cruel
punishment.
3
This case is apparently the first in which an appellate court has candidly altered a
lower court's sentence because the punishment was not appropriate for juveniles
tried as adults.4 The practice of sentencing minors as adults has been attacked in
other cases in various ways:
(1) By challenging a sentence of such duration that the defendant is unlikely to be
eligible for parole within his lifetime. 5 While this is a contention which has been made
both as to juveniles and adults, it is stronger for juveniles since rehabilitation is prob-
ably a greater possibility with them.
(2) By challenging a sentence as disproportionate to the offender's culpability, in
part because he is a juvenile. 6 This line of argument overlaps the next in that the
attack is on the relationship of punishment and offender, not merely punishment and
offense.
(3) By directly attacking sentences as inappropriate for a juvenile. The principal
case falls into this category. Before Workman the courts' response to this argument
has been unfavorable. One court sidestepped the contention by focusing on the serious-
ness of the conduct, viewing as irrelevant the fact that the offender was a juvenile.7
Another court considered past conduct of the offender more important than age,8 and
still another has considered the question inappropriate for judicial decision.9 In Work-
man the sentence was attacked as cruel and unusual.
The Federal Constitution and most of the states forbid the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishments. While the standards used in applying this prohibition are vague,
there have been three general approachest 0 to the cruel and unusual punishment
clause, which can be grouped into two lines of cases. One line focuses on the relation
of conduct and punishment. Within this line, one group has looked at the sentence in
relation to the conduct. 1' Unless a sentence is longer than the statutory maximum for
the crime, these courts have refused to alter it, viewing the statute as within the broad
3. Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
4. This case, of course, concerned only appellate consideration of age as a factor
in sentencing. Trial courts can and do take age into account when passing sentence,
but since this is a low visibility procedure, the exact basis for a particular sentence is
not often spelled out. This note is concerned with the limits within which sentences
can be imposed, not merely their propriety in a specific case.
5. People v. Dixon, 400 Ill. 449, 81 N.E.2d 257 (1948) (Juvenile sentenced to 199
years for rape, making him ineligible for parole for 66 years).
6. See, e.g., State v. Kilpatrick, 201 Kan. 6, 439 P.2d 99 (1968). Defendant, 20
years old, sought to come within a statutory prohibition on the death penalty for those
under 16 years. The court rejected this argument, as well as the argument that de-
fendant was emotionally disturbed and immature and thus should not be executed.
7. State v. Haley, 87 Ariz. 29, 347 P.2d 692 (1959).
8. Blake v. State, 244 Ark. 37, 423 S.W.2d 544 (1968).
9. State v. Hilton, 271 N.C. 456, 156 S.E.2d 833 (1967).
10. See Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
11. Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465 (1946); Johnson v. State,




discretionary power of the legislature, so that attacks would have to be made on the
statute itself. Another closely related group of cases within the same line discussed
the relationship of legitimate legislative purpose in making conduct criminal and the
severity of punishment provided for violation.1 2 Both groups of cases are alike in
that they weigh the social interest in not punishing an individual excessively against
the social interest in preventing certain forms of conduct. When the issue is raised, a
court must judge which social interest deserves greater weight in the immediate situa-
tion. Because this involves a case-by-case approach, the standard of a cruel and unusual
punishment within this line is vague.
A second line of cases addresses itself directly to the punishment.' 3 The question
here is whether the sentence or punishment offends the sense of fundamental fairness,
or is shocking to the community's conscience. The underlying inquiry of these cases is
how far society may go in any case in punishing criminals. Inherently barbaric treat-
ment is the usual kind of punishment disallowed by these courts. 14 Because this
criterion is uncertain, these cases, too, yield few generally useful or meaningful
principles. 15
Although the Workman court indicated its adherence to the last mentioned line of
cases as the basis of its decision, they do not support its reasoning. The court stated:
"[l]ife imprisonment without benefit of parole for two fourteen-year-old youths under
all the circumstances shocks the general conscience of society today and is intoler-
able to fundamental fairness."1 6 Apparently the court failed to recognize that its
opinion fell into a new line of cruel and unusual punishment cases. The focus of this
case is on punishment as applied to a particular class of persons, i.e., juveniles,
17
while the cases which deal with the idea of punishment shocking to the community
conscience focus on the punishment itself as applied to any offender. The court has
introduced into juvenile law a new approach to the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. In effect, Workman takes a first step in the juvenile field similar to hesitant
steps other courts have taken in the areas of drug addiction and alcoholism.
In Robinson v. California,18 the Supreme Court ruled that California's punish-
ment of a narcotic addict for the mere status of an addict was cruel and unusual. In
Easter v. District of Columbia,19 and Driver v. Hinnant,20 two United States circuit
12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111 (1958) (concurring opinion); United States
ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 235 F.Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
13. Weems v. United States, supra note 11, at 371; Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F.Supp.
804 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
14. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, supra note 13, where electric shocking of prisoners,
whipping on bare skin, etc. was held cruel and unusual.
15. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174-77 (1952) (concurring opinion of
Black, J.) for a discussion of the ambiguity of "shocking to the community con-
science."
16. Workmen v. Commonwealth, supra note 3, at 378.
17. "[L]ife imprisonment without benefit of parole ...remains the law of this juris-
diction and in our opinion validly so when applied to adults. However, a different
situation prevails when punishment of this stringent a nature is applied to a juvenile."
Id. at 377.
18. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
19. 361 F.2d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
20. 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
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courts of appeals prohibited punishment of chronic involuntary alcoholics for public
drunkenness. 21 These three decisions are shaky first steps toward a theory of cruel and
unusual punishment which would require that punishment for criminal conduct fit
the offender as well as the offense, that is, as to certain classes of persons, some pun-
ishments, or any criminal punishment for certain kinds of conduct, would violate the
cruel and unusual punishment clause. But these punishments would not be prohibited
as applied to other classes of offenders.
2 2
The Workman court placed heavy reliance on the possibility that juveniles can more
readily be rehabilitated than adults; 23 therefore, this class of persons, juveniles, must
not be deprived of their opportunity to be rehabilitated. It is difficult, however, to
reconcile this basis for striking down a sentence with other cruel and unusual punish-
ment cases. In other cases where the relation 'f punishment and offender was the
focus, the result was a prohibition on labeling the offender a criminal.2 4 The Work-
man court allowed criminal punishment but required that it be tempered to an extent
which would permit rehabilitation.
Such a holding begs the question: why are juveniles more readily rehabilitatable?
The court provides no answer. It may be that the court doubted the ability of juve-
niles to fully control themselves, that their immaturity made them less responsible for
their actions. This would be consistent with the court's language, for it could then be
said that the defendants' conduct was not evidence of a totally inalterable wickedness,
21. But see Powell v. Texas, 88 S. Ct. 2145 (1968), which held defendant's alcohol-
ism not a defense to a charge of public drunkenness. Justice Marshall's opinion, with
which four Justices concurred, concentrated heavily on the inadequacy of treatment
available for alcoholics: "But before we condemn the present practice across-the-
board, perhaps we ought to be able to point to some clear promise of a better world
for these unfortunate people." Id. at 2153. Marshall also pointed out: "[t]he record
in this case is utterly inadequate . . . . We know very little about the circumstances
surrounding the drinking bout which resulted in this conviction, or about Leroy Powell's
drinking problem, or indeed about alcoholism itself." Id. at 2149. Thus it can be fairly
said that the Court merely affirmed Powell's conviction because there was insufficient
evidence that alcoholism rendered his conduct involuntary in a constitutional sense.
The Court also was hesitant to extend the reasoning of Robinson because of the possible
legal consequences, especially that alcoholism might then be thought a defense to
crimes other than public drunkenness. Justice White, in his concurring opinion, also
underscored the importance of involuntariness as necessary to establish any constitu-
tional defense.
Since Easter and Driver found the defendants in those cases chronic involuntary
alcholics, Powell's effect on them is uncertain. Powell, in the final analysis, tells us
only that a defendant has the burden of proving his inability to refrain from public
drunkenness before alcoholism can be a defense to the charge. More than that would
seem to be dicta.
22. See supra note 17.
23. Workman v. Commonwealth, supra note 3, at 378:
The intent of the legislature in providing a penalty of life imprisonment without
benefit of parole for the offense of rape undoubtedly was to deal with dangerous
and incorrigible individuals who would be a constant threat to society. We believe
that incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth; that it is impossible to make a judg-
ment that a fourteen-year-old youth, no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible
for the rest of his life.
24. Robinson v. California, supra note 18; Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note
19; Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 20.
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but rather symptomatic of a condition or status amenable to treatment and eventually
curable.25 If this was the basis of the court's reasoning, then their failure to limit the
holding to emotionally disturbed children implies that whatever it is that makes ju-
veniles subject to rehabilitation is shared by all members of the class. This, it seems,
approaches the threshold of a theory of lessened responsibility for juveniles tried as
adults.26 Such a theory could lead to a holding that the disposition of juveniles after an
adjudication of delinquency must be different from that of adults in all respects, in
which case the practice of waiver would fall.
There are elements of inconsistency between the doctrine of parens patriae, the
state as benevolent guardian,27 and the practice of waiving juveniles for trial as
adults. By creating the juvenile court as a separate system from the adult courts the
legislature has evidenced a strong social interest in mitigating the responsibility of
juveniles. This imples that conduct is not to be the focus of the juvenile law system,
but should only be viewed as symptomatic. Disposition of juvenile offenders should
be geared primarily to their needs, not to society's need for protection.
To the extent that conduct is secondary it should be determinative only of the
treatment accorded a child within the juvenile system. Waiver based on seriousness of
conduct is inconsistent with this approach. How can it be said that a juvenile is such
only as long as he does not do certain things? Is a rock thrower any the more ju-
venile than the rapist? The underlying assumption that juveniles share certain char-
acteristics which make them less liable to punishment than adults conflicts with the
idea that serious conduct is a reasonable basis for waiver. No courts have gone so far
as to strike down waiver, and some have rejected the thought. 28
This court rejected that portion of a sentence imposed on two juvenile rapists
denying them the benefit of parole. Its reasoning seeks support from inapposite cases,
but the conclusion seems correct in view of cases in other areas which have read new
meaning into the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the constitution.
25. The causes of juvenile delinquency are not yet known. For a discussion of cur-
rent research efforts and the questionable validity of some widely held theories see
S. HATHAWAY & S. MONACHESi, ADOLESCENT PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOR (1963).
26. For a discussion of a related area, diminished, or partial, responsibility, and the
uncertain status of that doctrine at this time see A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 194-202 (1967).
27. For a discussion of parens patriae in the context of the juvenile courts, and
juvenile law in general (before In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)), see Note, Juvenile
Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv.
775 (1966).
28. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (by implication); Kent v. United
States, No. 20,922 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 1968), where the court held waiver of an emo-
tionally disturbed juvenile invalid, but specifically upheld waivers in general: "Of
course, this philosophy does not forbid all waivers. We only decide here that it does
forbid waiver of a seriously ill juvenile." Id. at 8.
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Tenancy by the Entireties-Deeds of Trust-Survivor's Right of
Contribution-White v. Parnell, 397 F. 2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
In 1963, Archie Parnell and his wife, Rhoda, bought a house in the District of Co-
lumbia and took title as tenants by the entireties. Two joint promissory notes, totaling
$12,950, were executed and secured by first and second deeds of trust on the property.
Rhoda Parnell died intestate in 1966, leaving as her sole heirs her brother, William
J. White, and her husband, who was appointed administrator of her estate. At the
time of her death, $11,778 remained due on the notes. As administrator, Archie Par-
nell claimed that his widow's personal estate was liable to contribute one half of the
balance due on the notes.
When the district court overruled the brother's objection to this account, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals was faced, for the first time, with the
issue of whether a surviving tenant by the entireties who, by right of survivorship,
has become sole owner of the property, is entitled to contribution from the estate of
the deceased tenant toward payment of a jointly executed promissory note secured by
a deed of trust.! Since this was a case of first impression in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, the court followed statutory mandate 2 and looked
to the laws of Maryland "for guidance" but not "blind allegiance." 3 It held that the
surviving tenant is entitled to contribution from the personal estate of a deceased ten-
ant by the entireties.
Central to the reasoning of the rule upholding the right of contribution is the idea
that the operation of the right of survivorship does not involve any conveyance from
one tenant to the survivor; the interest of the deceased merely ceases. 4 Because there
is no transfer of interests, neither is there any transfer of the obligations.
The other more basic concept on which the court relies is the severability of the note
and the deed: the note constitutes the obligation and the deed is merely security for
its payment. If the obligation is on each co-tenant as a co-maker of the promissory
note and since the estate of a deceased promissor is liable on such a note to the full
extent of his original obligation, then "it follows that [the survivor] is entitled to
contribution from the estate of the decedent.
' 5
1. White v. Parnell, 397 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
2. D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-301 (1967). Though the issue had not been decided in the
circuit court, the district court had upheld the right of contribution in cases such as
In re Lewis, Admin. No. 53-756 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 1940).
3. White v. Parnell, supra note 1, at 710 n.l. The court looked to Cunningham v.
Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 A. 444 (1930), Annot., 67 A.L.R. 1181 (1930).
4. In re Keil's Estate, 51 Del. 351, 145 A.2d 563 (1958), Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 1004
(1961); Magenheimer v. Councilman, 76 Ind. App. 583, 125 N.E. 77 (1919); Cunning-
ham v. Cunningham, supra note 3; Nobile v. Bartletta, 109 N.J. Eq. 119, 156 A. 483
(1931) ; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Black, 198 N.C. 219, 151 S.E. 269 (1930); In re
Kershaw's Estate, 352 Pa. 205, 42 A.2d 538 (1945); Newson v. Shackleford, 163 Tenn.
358, 43 S.W.2d 384 (1931) ; In re Rosenthal, 34 Wis. 2d 402, 149 N.W.2d 585 (1967).
See also Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 96 S.E.2d 788 (1957) (right of survivorship
in a joint tenancy).
5. White v. Parnell, supra note 1, at 711.
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The estate of tenancy by the entireties with the characteristic right of survivorship
was recognized by the courts as early as the fourteenth century.6 The estate is one
held by husband and wife and arises out of the legal contemplation that husband and
wife are one.7 The concept is that each tenant owns all the property, holding per tout
et non per my. When one tenant dies, the other receives nothing new; he merely as-
sumes sole ownership of all the property and the interest of the deceased tenant
simply expires.8
While the right of a surviving tenant by the entireties to contribution from the
deceased spouse's estate for the payment of the joint debt has not been the subject of
a great amount of litigation, it has evoked sharp controversy. Among the states in
which the issue has been litigated, the majority uphold the right of a survivor to con-
tribution.9 There is, however, a strong minority which deny contribution under cir-
cumstances similar to those in the instant case. 10
The reasoning of the majority is that the obligation arises from the note and, as
such, survives the maker to become a claim against his estate. The manner in which
title to the collateral is held is immaterial to the obligations of the principals. 1
"[T]he right of contribution flows from the debt, not from the mortgage lien,"' 12 and
such a debt, as between the principals, renders the estate of a deceased co-obligor
liable for his share of the obligation. The existence of a co-obligor is a contractual
fact on which each maker relied when he signed the note. The survivor's right to
contribution is based on this reliance.
An argument against the idea of equal obligation on the note is that the debt is
owed wholly by the husband and wholly by the wife and that, therefore, the survivor
remains liable for the whole debt. Faced with this argument, the court in In re Kei 13
evaded it merely by noting that such was not the law of Delaware. The fact that the
same argument was used in Indiana 14 to uphold the right of contribution, however,
suggests that the premise that the husband and wife are one and that each owns all is
quite malleable and can be used to reach different results on similar facts.' 5 Some
cases justify contribution from the estate of a tenant who no longer has any interest
in the fruits of the debt by presuming that some benefit did accrue to him while he
was alive, or at least that payment of the debt by the survivor constituted a benefit to
6. English, Concurrent Estates in Real Property I, 11 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 63 (1962).
7. English, Concurrent Estates in Real Property 11, 12 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 1 (1963).
8. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 6.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
9. See cases cited supra note 4.
10. Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1956) ; Florio v. Greenspan, 340 Mass. 642,
165 N.E.2d 753 (1960); Robinson v. Bogert, 187 Misc. 735, 64 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1946);
Geldart v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 209 App. Div. 581, 205 N.Y.S. 238 (1924).
See dissenting opinions in In re Keil's Estate, supra note 4, at 358, 145 A.2d at 566;
In re Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa. 519, 525, 84 A.2d 209, 211 (1951) ; and Ratte v. Ratte,
260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 870 (1927) (right of survivorship in a joint tenancy).
11. In re Keil's Estate, supra note 4, at 355, 145 A.2d at 565.
12. Id, at 356, 145 A.2d at 565. But see dissenting opinion at 358, 145 A.2d at 566.
13. Supra note 4.
14. Magenheimer v. Councilman, supra note 4.
15. Compare Magenheimer v. Councilman, supra note 4, with Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Black, supra note 4, and Geldart v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., supra
note 10.
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the estate for which the estate must contribute.1 6 The District of Columbia court
relies on ideas expressed in In re Keil,17 a leading case in the field, which disavows
any consideration of the idea of respective benefit as a determinant of the right to
contribution since "[t]his would ...[create] a rule difficult of application."'18 It also
contends that since the obligation is on the note, the nature of the estates in the col-
lateral is "immaterial." 19
At the heart of the reasoning of the majority is a desire for a simple rule relying on
the more modern concept of the note rather than the more fictional characteristics of
the estate by the entireties.
The analysis of the minority decisions is subject to fewer vagaries than the often
divergent reasoning of the majority. Its theme is that the nature of the estate in the
collateral gives the note its character,20 and that, because the right of survivorship
terminates the interest of the decedent, it is unjust and inequitable to require his
estate "to contribute toward paying off an incumbrance on the property of another."
2 1
Jurisdictions such as New York focus on the equitable considerations in examining
the doctrine of equitable contribution: "The right to contribution . . . rests on the lia-
bility of the person unjustly enriched to return or refund all or part of the enrich-
ment."'22 (Emphasis added.) If a survivor's plea for contribution is thus to be granted,
his case must rest upon his showing that the deceased tenant or his estate was unjustly
enriched at the expense of the survivor or, at the very least, that it acquired some
benefit. If unjust enrichment be the criterion, the problem of weighing the benefits
derived by the respective tenants cannot be avoided by threatening that a rule respect-
ing relative benefits would be "difficult of application;" nor can the nature of the es-
tate held by the obligors be ignored as "immaterial," since the collateral is the benefit
derived from the obligation and the estate in it an indication of the parties' respective
rights in that collateral.
The idea that there is no conveyance involved when a tenant by the entireties dies
and the right of survivorship operates is said to be "[c]entral to the reasoning in most
of the cases allowing contribution." 23 If there is no conveyance, neither is there any
change in the obligations of the parties. But the assertion that the surviving tenant
acquires nothing new is fictional; what he once held as an undescendible and unde-
visable estate subject to his co-tenant's right of survivorship, he now holds as a sole
owner. Though the size of the estate which he owns may be the same, the value of his
interest has increased appreciably. 24 At the same time, all interest of the other ten-
16. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Black, supra note 4. But cf. dissenting
opinion in In re Keil's Estate, supra note 4, at 358, 361, 145 A.2d at 566, 568.
17. White v. Parnell, supra note 1, at 710.
18. In re Keil's Estate, supra note 4, at 357, 145 A.2d at 566.
19. Id. at 356, 145 A.2d at 565.
20. See Lopez v. Lopez, supra note 10.
21. In re Keil's Estate, supra note 4, at 361, 145 A.2d at 568 (dissenting opinion).
22. Geldart v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., supra note 10, at 240.
23. White v. Parnell, supra note 1, at 710.
24. The increase in the equity held by a surviving tenant is illustrated in detail by
Judge Bramhall in his dissenting opinion in In re Keil's Estate, supra note 4, at 360,
145 A.2d at 567-68.
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ant ceases completely and automatically at his death, and the benefit is in no way
retained by his estate.
Legal fictions are created in order to bend the law, often to serve some overriding
social policy. Since the results reached in the cases holding the majority position are
the consequence of a legal fiction which has its roots in the fourteenth century, the
continuance of the fiction of the estate by the entireties can be justified only if it is a
successful tool of the law in serving some worthwhile social policy.
The rule established for the District of Columbia in White has the effect, inter alia,
of increasing the chance that the mortgaged property will be retained by the immedi-
ate household of the deceased. Since the District has no homestead law, this decision
gives a measure of security to the surviving spouse and children which they might not
otherwise have if keeping the house required paying the entire mortgage.25 The only
parties affected adversely by this decision are the heirs (or legatees) of the deceased,
whose interests in the estate are preceded by the survivor's right to contribution. In
effect, an understandable policy decision has been made in favor of the decedent's
immediate family.
Since the land is the primary fund for payment, the position of the mortgagee is
not endangered even if the estate of the deceased tenant is insufficient to pay half of
the mortgage note; if the survivor is unable to assume the entire debt, the mortgagee
will foreclose. Other creditors of the estate are affected only in that the surviving
tenant ranks as another major creditor whose interest is not secured by any asset of
the estate. 26 The interests of these creditors, however, are usually protected today by
the widespread use of secured interests.
The tenancy by the entireties with the right of survivorship has always had the
effect of preserving the property in the hands of the immediate family. Allowing con-
tribution from the estate of the deceased co-tenant strengthens this policy by increas-
ing the likelihood that the survivor will keep the property free from foreclosure. Thus,
while the result in White v. Parnell may seem "unjust and inequitable" in theory, the
court, in granting contribution to the surviving spouse, has carried the original policy
of the tenancy by the entireties further than would ever be possible under the reason-
ing of the cases which deny such contribution, and the "equity" of the right to con-
tribution has been rescued by a viable combination of the theories of the tenancy by
the entireties and the promissory note.
27
25. Cf. English, Concurrent Estates in Real Property II, supra note 7, at 15.
26. Judge Holtzoff, in his memorandum opinion for the district court in White v.
Parnell, thought it appropriate that land bought by the tenants as a residence for them-
selves should be retained as a complete benefit to the surviving spouse rather than
that "the next of kin should have a windfall, which they would receive if the estate of
the deceased spouse was not required to contribute one-half . . . ." In re Estate of Parnell,
275 F. Supp. 609, at 610 (D.D.C. 1967).
27. Carrying the court's reasoning one step further, the surviving spouse becomes a
creditor of the estate of the deceased tenant by the entireties, and his claim falls
within the lowest category of creditors, namely "all other just claims, which shall be
on an equal footing, without priority." D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1325(a) (4) (1967). (Em-
phasis added.) Quaere whether, in keeping with the apparent policy of the decision in
the instant case, the survivor should not be given some priorty; to do otherwise would
be to emasculate the policy favoring the decedent's immediate family.
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